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Highlights 
 First consideration of how the medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortices uniquely represent 
components of cognitive maps of task space 
 Posits that medial orbitofrontal cortex represents terminal states (usually outcomes of 
actions) 
 Posits that lateral orbitofrontal cortex represents initial states  
 Medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortex achieve their respective functions somewhat 





 The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been proposed to function as a cognitive map of task 











provides a cohesive explanation for a number of disparate findings regarding the OFC’s role in a 
broad array of tasks. Concurrently, evidence has begun to reveal the functional heterogeneity of OFC 
subregions, particularly the medial and lateral OFC. How these subregions uniquely contribute to the 
OFC’s role as a cognitive map of task space, however, has not been explored. Here we propose that, 
in rodents, the lateral OFC represents the agent’s initial position within that task map (i.e. initial 
state), determining which actions are available as a consequence of that position, whereas the 
medial OFC represents the agent’s desired future position within the task map (i.e. terminal state), 
influencing which actions are selected to achieve that position. We argue that these processes are 
achieved somewhat independently and somewhat interdependently, and are achieved through 
similar but non-identical circuitry. 
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The notion that goal-directed decision-making relies on a ‘cognitive map’ or ‘mental model’ 
of the different steps involved in a task has gained significant traction in recent years. A number of 
studies have begun to identify the putative neural structures and circuits supporting this function, 
with several lines of evidence suggesting the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) plays a key role (1–4). Recent 
studies have also demonstrated a high degree of functional heterogeneity within the OFC (5–11), yet 
how these functionally distinct OFC subregions might differentially contribute to its function as a 











In this review we argue that, in rodents at least, the majority of findings are consistent with 
the lateral OFC inferring the animal’s initial position within a task and thus what actions are available 
for selection as a consequence (i.e. initial state), whereas the medial OFC provides information 
about what future position within task space is likely if the animal selects a particular action (i.e. the 
terminal state, represented by what goal will be achieved). To put it another way, the function of 
lateral OFC has been likened to the dropping of a google maps ‘pin’ to determine one’s position 
within the task (3), information that can then be fed to downstream structures (notably the 
striatum, (12, 13)) to provide contextual information for decision-making and action selection. Using 
this same analogy, we suggest that the medial OFC can also influence actions (routes), but that it 
does so by providing information about the desired final destination (i.e. by representing the final 
goal). In this way, the functions of lateral OFC and medial OFC appear to be highly related and even 
interdependent – it is difficult to determine which route is most desirable without knowing the final 
destination – however they are not interchangeable. Finally, we argue that both initial and terminal 
state information appears to be particularly OFC-dependent when it relies on partially unobservable 
information, because several studies have shown that actions can be selected accurately in spite of 
OFC inactivation (lateral and/or medial) when all of the necessary state information is observable. It 
should be noted that although this is primarily a review of rodent studies, where the evidence most 
clearly points to the account we have outlined here, there has been some evidence that human OFC 
represents cognitive maps in a similar manner (2, 14).  
 
The Role of States in Decision-Making 
Within the laboratory, decision-making tends to be operationalized as the selection of goal-
directed actions. Such actions are effortful, flexibly deployed, and must be motivated by both the 
value of the outcome or goal (goal criterion), and the contingency between the action and outcome 











automatically without regard for the outcome. Both goal-directed and habitual processes are 
integral to everyday functioning, yet are neurally separable as shown by experiments that have 
demonstrated deficits in one system but not the other as a result of damage to distinct brain 
structures (16–18).  
Computationally, reinforcement learning (RL) models have posited that goal-directed actions 
are akin to model-based models (19). This means that in order to exert goal-directed control, 
animals build a mental model (i.e. a cognitive map of task space) of the various steps that are 
involved in a task. Animals can then simulate their prospective journey through the steps of the 
model to estimate the probability of obtaining their goal. Habits, on the other hand, are thought to 
be more akin to model-free models (19) (although this position is not without controversy (20), 
because they do not rely on cognitive maps in the same manner. Instead, they are elicited in 
response to various stimuli in the environment. Model-free RL posits that habits become valuable 
over the course of learning by being paired with reinforcers, causing value to be ‘cached’ at the level 
of the action itself. Unlike model-based RL, altered reinforcer value cannot immediately modify the 
cached value of actions until that reinforcer is experienced as a consequence of the action taken. 
Further, model-based but not model-free RL recognises the identity of the outcome; model-free RL 
recognises only its value.  
Cognitive task maps consist of ‘states’, the concept of which has been useful for 
conceptualizing how action selection is influenced by internal and external cues. States are roughly 
akin to ‘situations’ determined by alterations in external stimuli, such as a light or a noise, or by 
internal information garnered from memory, or some combination of both. Within each state there 
are certain actions available and taking a particular action will transition the agent into the next 
state. Figure 1 shows an example of a state representation for the task of making a cup of tea. In this 
example, an individual might initiate making a cup of tea whilst in State 1, which they enter into 











state. That individual then switches the kettle on, causing the person to transition into the ‘kettle on’ 
state (State 2) determined by the noise, sight, and feeling of the kettle switching on. The agent 
continues in this manner until the tea is finally being drunk, at which point the terminal ‘goal’ state is 
reached (Figure 1).  
State representations are complex, and often require the integration of several sensory 
inputs with internal information. In our tea example above, the ‘kettle on’ state is determined by 
combining information from (at least) three sensory modalities (the noise, sight, and feeling of the 
kettle switching on) with the internal knowledge that ‘tea’ is the final goal. As has been noted 
elsewhere1,18, the anatomical circuitry of the OFC is particularly well placed to integrate external and 
internal information in this way, as it receives inputs from many sensory areas (e.g. auditory cortex, 
olfactory tubercle), as well as areas central to learning and memory such as the hippocampus, 
amygdala, and ventral tegmental area (21–23). Moreover, the OFC has substantial outputs onto 
striatal action selection centres (23), providing a pathway via which OFC-dependent state 
representations could directly influence the selection of actions. Both medial and lateral subregions 
reflect this pattern of connectivity to some extent, with a significant degree of overlap, but there are 
also some differences. For example, although both medial and lateral OFC project to basolateral 
amygdala, only medial OFC appears to project to the central amygdala (22, 23). Similar differences 
exist with regards to cortico-cortical, hippocampal, striatal and other thalamic connections with to 
medial versus lateral OFC (21–23). These differences are sometimes subtle (i.e. projections to 
different portions of the same structure), but are present nonetheless. Overall, these studies suggest 
the anatomical suitability of both medial and lateral OFC for representing state, but the differences 
in their connectivity suggest that their role in doing so is not identical.  
Thus, there is anatomical support for our claim that the lateral OFC represents initial states 











goal, state S7 in Figure 1). The empirical evidence for these claims is presented below, with a 
summary of the relevant findings presented in Table 1.  
 
Instrumental Outcome Devaluation 
Instrumental outcome devaluation is considered the gold standard protocol to assess 
whether actions are under goal-directed (model-based) control. The typical two-outcome version of 
this task is summarised in Table 2: In Stage 1, animals are trained to press two levers (A1 and A2) for 
two outcomes (O1 and O2). They are then given the opportunity to eat one of these outcomes to 
satiety to reduce its value relative to the alternate outcome12. Immediately following satiety 
treatment rats are placed back into the operant chambers and allowed to respond freely on each 
lever under extinction (i.e. with no outcomes delivered). According to model-based RL, if animals are 
selecting actions according to the value of prospective outcomes, then they should preferentially 
respond on the lever associated with the valued outcome relative to the lever associated with the 
devalued outcome (valued > devalued). 
Critical to this task, animals must be able to accurately represent the outcomes of their 
actions (i.e. the terminal states). This is represented in Fig 2A. We have demonstrated (4, 6) that 
disruption to medial OFC functioning (anterior medial OFC in particular) via either permanent 
excitotoxic lesions, or temporary inactivation across test using chemogenetics (hM4Di designer 
receptors exclusively activated by designer drugs: DREADDs), abolished rats’ capacity to show goal-
directed choice on an outcome devaluation task. Instead, rats performed the two available actions 
(devalued and non-devalued) at equal rates, and this result is represented in Fig 2B. Importantly, 
when an almost-identical devaluation test was conducted, except  that each outcome was actually 
delivered as a result of each lever press on test (i.e. outcomes were observable), medial OFC 
inactivated animals showed intact devaluation (valued > devalued). This pattern of responding 











ability to infer terminal states defined by absent outcomes (the code for which can be found here: 
https://github.com/adezfouli/OFCSim, and the state space representation for which is in Figure 2A). 
In contrast to this role for medial OFC, a number of experiments have demonstrated that 
inactivating the lateral OFC via either pre- or post-training lesions (24, 25), chemogenetic 
inactivation of lateral OFC cell bodies (26) or its connections with the basolateral amygdala (27) 
leave instrumental outcome devaluation intact, represented in Fig 2B. This is consistent with the 
argument that lateral OFC represents unobservable initial states, because both actions (left and right 
lever press) are available simultaneously in a single initial state (state 1 in Figure 2A). Thus, the levers 
are observable such that available actions need not be inferred from memory. In two exceptions to 
these findings, Gremel and Costa (28, 29) used a different kind of instrumental outcome devaluation 
task to infer that the lateral OFC might regulate instrumental outcome devaluation. The state space 
representation of this task is presented in Fig 2C. They trained animals to press a single lever in one 
context by using a random interval (RI) schedule to promote habits, and trained the same lever in 
another context using a random ratio (RR) schedule to promote goal-directed responding. On test, 
devaluation was demonstrated (Valued > Devalued) for lateral OFC-intact mice in the RR but not RI 
context, whereas lateral OFC inactivated mice (by way of lesion, chemogenetics, or optogenetics) did 
not show devaluation in either context (Valued = Devalued, Fig 2D). As a result, the authors 
concluded that the lateral OFC is necessary for instrumental outcome devaluation.  
Although this remains a possibility, the involvement of lOFC in this task can equally be 
explained by its representation of initial state information. Specifically, it is likely that the alteration 
in reward schedules (RI vs. RR) between contexts required the formation of two different states to 
disambiguate these different contingencies (30, 31) (e.g. State 1 in context 1, State 2 in context 2, Fig 
2C). These latent states are internally generated, and function to retrieve the appropriate 
contingency and reduce interference by the competing contingency. As argued by Wilson et al, 











and so would attribute competing sets of contingencies to the same ‘default’ state such that they 
interfere with each other. Thus, we suggest that a similar process could be in effect here, such that 
intact animals partitioned information appropriately and demonstrated intact devaluation in the 
appropriate (goal-directed/RR) context, animals without a functional lateral OFC likely generalised 
between these states, or at the very least suffered interference between them. 
 Together, the results of these experiments neatly demonstrate an important difference 
between the role of initial and terminal state representation in action selection and the respective 
roles of lateral OFC and medial OFC in each. That is, as illustrated in Figure 2C, in the two action, two 
outcome devaluation task, initial state information is not necessary because both levers are 
observable, but animals must represent the different terminal states (O1 and O2, which are not 
presented on test) to select the appropriate action (valued > devalued). This capacity is profoundly 
disrupted by inactivations of medial but not lateral OFC (4, 6, 24–26) (Figure 2 A-B). By contrast, an 
intact lateral OFC is only necessary for instrumental devaluation when animals must use initial state 
information to partition learning about two distinct action-outcome contingencies in order to apply 





 In a typical contingency reversal protocol, the animal is initially trained such that one action-
outcome (A1-O1) contingency is rewarded but another is not (A2-), and this relationship is later 
reversed (A1-, A2-O1, see Table 2). Over time, intact animals will alter their response preference 
according to the currently rewarded contingency. Figure 3A-B shows a cognitive map of task space 











phase in Fig 3B, they partition the new contingency into a separate state (S2) from the original 
contingency (S1) to prevent interference. Consistent with the presumed role of lateral OFC in initial 
state representation, there are several demonstrations that lateral/ventrolateral OFC inactivations 
(mainly lesions) impair contingency reversal performance, generally being slower to acquire the 
reversed response and making more perseverative errors (32–35), shown in Figure 3C. Animals with 
lateral OFC lesions are presumed unable to partition information in this way, instead attributing both 
contingencies to the same ‘default' state such that they suffer interference leading to impaired task 
performance. Likewise, lateral OFC lesions disrupt reversal learning when outcome identities are 
reversed (26). Rats were trained on two response-outcome pairings, A1-O1 and A2-O2, and then 
these contingencies were reversed; A1-O2, A2-O1, under chemogenetic inactivation of the lateral 
OFC. In between each phase of training, animals were tested for outcome devaluation to assess 
which response-outcome association was dominant. Whereas instrumental devaluation was intact 
following initial instrumental training (as mentioned above), when the lever press-outcome 
contingencies were reversed, lateral OFC inactivation did impair devaluation performance.  
There are relatively fewer investigations of the role of the medial OFC in reversal learning, 
and several of the studies that have investigated it have done so in probabilistic tasks (33, 36), 
confounding their interpretation. As we have argued previously (4) in tasks such as probabilistic 
learning, delay discounting, and even progressive ratio tasks, where medial OFC lesions are often 
found to impair performance (33, 36–38), this is likely because each of these tasks require the 
estimation of likely outcomes when those outcomes are not directly observable. Thus it is 
straightforward to understand how removing the medial OFC would impair the ability to properly 
make such estimations and ultimately impair performance.  
Gourley et al. (38) did, however, examine the effect of medial OFC lesions on a more 
straightforward reversal task in mice, and found them to impair reversal learning. The manner of this 











lesions in the same study. Specifically, whereas ventrolateral OFC-lesioned mice were slower to learn 
the new (reversed) contingencies, medial OFC-lesioned mice were able to learn the new 
contingencies as readily as controls (represented in Figure 3C) but additionally performed more 
perseverative responses on the previously rewarded nose-poke. The fact that lesioned mice learned 
the new contingencies as quickly as controls suggests they were able to partition conflicting 
contingencies according to initial state (see1 and Figure 3A-B). Instead, in line with our framework, 
the deficit may lie in their inability to appropriately extinguish the previously rewarded response, 
due to an inability to retrieve a representation of the expected outcome and appropriately assign an 
error-based learning mechanism to drive model-based extinction. Therefore, mice with medial OFC 
lesions would have had to rely on model-free processes alone to extinguish the initial contingency, 
causing slower extinction and more perseverative responses relative to controls.  
More recently, Hervig, Robbins and colleagues (39) found that pharmacological inactivation 
of medial OFC improved reversal learning on a visual discrimination task, particularly in the early 
phase of learning. As they noted, this would be precisely the result if the medial OFC were 
responsible for mentally representing unobservable outcomes. This is because the animals with 
mOFC inactivation would be unable to recall the prior (pre-reversal) contingencies, and would thus 
experience less interference in acquiring the new (reversed) contingencies than controls. Indeed, 
interference between initial and reversed contingencies would be expected to be highest in controls 
during the early phases of reversal, and it is this phase in which they differed most from medial OFC-
inactivated animals. These authors further found that lateral OFC inactivation impaired reversal 
performance relative to controls, in line with the other findings we have noted above. They also 
found, however, that lateral OFC inactivations appeared to improve the learning of a novel visual 
discrimination task, which also involves new contingency learning and thus would imply a shift to a 
new state. If replicable, therefore, this finding might suggest that a narrowing of the current account 















Like outcome devaluation, sensitivity to contingency degradation is considered characteristic 
of goal directed instrumental actions. A typical protocol is presented in Table 2. In Stage 1, animals 
are trained on two action-outcome contingencies, and then in Stage 2, animals receive additional, 
unsignalled deliveries of one of the outcomes (A1-O1/O1). This effectively reduces the contingency 
between that action and outcome (4, 40). An animal using goal-directed control will reduce its 
responding on the degraded lever, whilst maintaining responding on the non-degraded lever (in 
accordance with the contingency criterion). We have previously argued that contingency 
degradation relies on the ability to separate the different contingencies learned in Stage 1 (original 
contingencies) and Stage 2 (degraded/nondegraded contingencies) into separate internal states (40). 
Importantly, however, because outcomes are present and observable throughout this task, an 
inability to infer terminal outcome states should not be necessary for intact degradation 
performance. Thus, our framework predicts that the lateral OFC but not the medial OFC should be 
critical for performance on this task. 
There is some support for this prediction. Specifically, we have found that an intact medial 
OFC was not necessary for contingency degradation performance using this design (4). Although the 
role of the lateral OFC in this exact procedure has not been tested, the selective knockdown of brain 
derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) in the lateral OFC in mice has been found to abolish nominally 
instrumental (nose-poke) contingency degradation performance (41). It should be noted however, 
that the same authors (42) used the same procedure and found that chemogenetic inactivation of 
ventrolateral OFC had no effect on degradation learning, but it did have an effect on sustained 











both learning and performance of degradation, it is possible that the ventrolateral target of these 
inactivations has a slightly different function to the more lateral portion. Even more recent findings 
from the same group (43) support this notion, because when the ventrolateral OFC was again 
targeted in the same procedure, but viral spread was increased (and thus likely to have spread to the 
more lateral OFC), degradation learning was once again impaired. Alternately, the reason for this 
discrepancy may be methodological, as these studies used a somewhat different procedure to that 
we have described (here and in Table 2), in which responding no longer produced any contingent 
outcomes (contingency of -1 rather than 0). Thus, it is possible that this more acute version of the 
task encouraged learning according to model-free processes that could proceed in the absence of 
state inference.  
Taken together, therefore, these studies support the notion that lateral OFC regulates 
contingency degradation, but more studies are needed using a purely instrumental (e.g. lever press) 
version of the task that does not involve extinction. For this task, our framework makes the clear 
prediction that lateral but not medial OFC inactivation should impair performance.  
 
Pavlovian-instrumental Transfer 
 Although the results of OFC dysfunction in each of the tasks reviewed above provides clear 
evidence of the functional heterogeneity of medial and lateral OFC, this is not always the case. In 
specific Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT; Table 2), for example, lesions of both medial and 
lateral OFC have been found to impair performance (4, 6, 24). In this task, rats are first trained to 
associate two stimuli with two unique outcomes (S1-O1, S2-O2). In the second, instrumental, phase 
of training, they are trained to perform two distinct actions for those same outcomes (A1-O1, A2-
O2). On test, when presented with the stimuli and levers together for the first time, but no food 
outcomes, animals will typically respond on the lever associated with the same outcome as the 











We suggest that specific PIT requires the inference of both initial and terminal state representations 
to guide performance, which is why lesions of both have been found to affect its performance. 
Specifically, initial state information is necessary on test because this is the first time that the 
Pavlovian and instrumental contingency information learned during training must be inferred from 
memory, and integrated to drive responding on the correct lever. In addition, unobservable terminal 
state information about which lever earned which outcome must be inferred to drive responding on 
the correct lever. Thus, consistent with the aforementioned findings, our framework predicts a role 
for both lateral and medial OFC in this task. 
 
Do lateral and medial OFC represent state information in the same way for Pavlovian tasks? 
 All of the studies we have reviewed so far have been either entirely, or predominantly, 
instrumental in nature. However, a number of studies have shown that the lateral OFC also appears 
to regulate learning and/or expression in a number of Pavlovian tasks such as (Pavlovian) 
devaluation (25, 44–46), overexpectation (47), identity unblocking (48), and preconditioning (49). 
Furthermore, if the same framework outlined above were applied to these tasks, then it would be 
difficult to argue that lateral OFC is representing initial but not terminal states. In Pavlovian 
devaluation, for example, this task is usually employed in the absence of any conflicting 
contingencies. Thus, if we apply the same logic outlined above for the instrumental version of this 
task, lateral OFC inactivations should leave it intact, but this is clearly not the case (25, 44–46).  
 We believe that the reason for this might lie in the fundamental difference in how the 
cognitive map of a Pavlovian versus an instrumental devaluation task is mentally represented. 
Specifically, in an instrumental task an action must be performed in order to transition through 
states (referred to as the ‘transition function’ (50)). In our tea example above (Figure 1), the 
individual switches on the kettle to transition into the ‘kettle on’ state and the individual will not 











which a cue (e.g. a tone) is typically presented, and food is delivered to the food receptacle 
regardless of the animal’s actions. Thus, the animal transitions into a ‘food delivered’ state without 
performing any action (note that entry into the food receptacle could be seen as potentially 
instrumental, but could also be a Pavlovian conditioned response to the sight of the food). As such, it 
is not clear exactly what would lead to the state-to-state transition in a ‘model-based’ cognitive map 
of a Pavlovian task (time? Sequence of events?), and as has been noted in articles regarding the 
potential model-based nature of some Pavlovian responses (51, 52) the algorithm – and hence the 
transition function – for model-based Pavlovian learning is still unknown. 
 This is relevant to the current argument, because the separation of initial and terminal 
states in instrumental studies is reliant on the action-based transitions between them. In the 
absence of such transitions, it is difficult to say what the potential role of medial versus lateral OFC 
in Pavlovian studies might be. Further, it has been argued (51, 53) that in Pavlovian conditioning, the 
stimuli may take on properties of the outcome in a way that does not occur in instrumental 
conditioning (referred to as ‘stimulus substitution’), and indeed phenomena such as conditioned 
reinforcement (54) and second-order conditioning (55) support this claim. If this is indeed the case, 
then this would suggest that it is difficult (if not impossible) to separate initial versus terminal state 
information in such studies, because the presentation of a cue itself has taken on properties of both 
the cue and outcome – i.e. the initial and terminal states. As such, there may be no role for the 
medial OFC in Pavlovian learning, as this is fulfilled by the Pavlovian cue which is fully observable. 
Instead, such learning relies on the lateral OFC to retrieve a representation of task structure, but 
only when Pavlovian cues are ambiguous (3). Alternatively, it is possible that the framework we have 
outlined here applies solely to instrumental studies, and that medial versus lateral OFC might have 
very different roles in Pavlovian studies that may or may not be related to state representation. 











Medial versus lateral orbitofrontal cortical function across species 
Although the studies reviewed here have primarily been conducted in rodents, we believe it 
is possible that these relative roles for medial and lateral OFC could apply across species. The 
question of degree of OFC homology between rodents and primates (including humans) in particular 
is still under debate, although it is generally accepted the OFC is much more developed in primates 
(56). Most notable are differences with regards to cytoarchitecture: rodents differ from primates in 
that they possess only agranular but not dysgranular or granular cortex (57) (although its 
composition is similar to that of primates (58)). Anatomical circuitry does provide some homological 
support as OFC-striatal (13) and OFC-thalamic (59) connections appear to be topographically similar 
across species. Most notably for current purposes, there is abundant evidence that the medial and 
lateral OFC share somewhat overlapping but distinct projection networks in both rodents (23, 60) 
and primates (58, 59).  
There are also similarities with regards to the functions ascribed to human/primate and 
rodent OFC and their consequences for associative learning mechanisms. For instance, there is 
substantial evidence that the primate OFC is involved in encoding expected or abstract reinforcer 
value (61), choice alternatives (62, 63), or the sensory properties of reinforcers (56, 64), but not the 
specific motor response chosen (65). These findings are consistent with our claims because the 
inference of a terminal state by medial OFC involves integrating expected and abstract reinforcer 
value, as well as the sensory properties of reinforcers. Likewise, if lateral OFC provides information 
about initial task state, as we have also claimed, this would be reflected in neuronal responses 
relating to choice alternatives. Critically, as has been suggested in the primate literature (66), we 
propose that the actual choices and therefore activity related to motor responses, occurs 
downstream of the OFC, likely in striatal regions (12).  
The notion that medial and lateral OFC are functionally separable in primates also appears to 











that primates with lateral OFC damage are, like rodents, particularly impaired on tasks that require 
altering behaviour when reinforcement contingencies change, such as contingency reversal and 
goGo/nogo NoGo tasks (64, 65). Medial OFC lesions on the other hand impair devaluation 
performance in macaques (66) just as they do in rodents (4). Moreover, there have been at least two 
studies conducted in humans that have specifically provided evidence for cognitive mapping and its 
dependence on OFC (2, 12). Taken together, therefore, we suggest that at the level of associative 
learning and the expression of learned associations, there are significant parallels between the 
primate and rodent OFC.  
Whether our account of medial versus lateral OFC function applies across species or not, it is 
undeniable that any OFC-based representations of an individual’s goals or location in task space 
would be substantially more complex in primates. For example, for rodents and other lower-order 
(i.e. non-primate) mammals, effective reinforcers are almost exclusively those related to immediate 
biological requirements for survival (i.e. food, shelter, reproduction), or stimuli that have become 
associated with those outcomes. In contrast, humans and to some extent other primates, exist in 
rich and complex social worlds, where types of reinforcement extend well beyond the boundaries of 
biological requirement to meet higher-order emotional needs. Indeed, it has been argued that 
emotions are states elicited by goals or reinforcers (67) and the role of the human (and primate) OFC 
in this context is to decode and represent reinforcers and the reward value of stimuli that predict 
them. It is along these lines that we propose that primate and rodent OFC are most likely to differ; 
humans are capable of selecting goals that will provide complex emotional reinforcement associated 
with, for example, altruism, trust, humour, and pride. It remains unclear what role, if any, rodent 
OFC plays in complex emotion, and along these lines significant differences may emerge.  
 











Here we have reviewed studies that investigate the distinct functions of medial and lateral 
subregions of OFC. However it is worth noting that even within different subregions of OFC, 
subpopulations of neurons have shown a remarkable degree of heterogeneity with regards to the 
types of functions they subserve. Electrophysiological studies in rats and monkeys have discovered, 
for example, that a subpopulation of neurons located within the lateral OFC preferentially codes for 
value (65), but others have different lateral OFC populations that respond to outcome identities, 
outcome location, or even responses, independently of value (68–70). Moreover, these differing 
responses are not always static across the changing conditions of the task, with some OFC neurons 
observed to respond to value prior to reversal and then stop responding to value after reversal, in a 
seemingly context (or state) dependent manner (70). An even more recent study has managed to 
optogenetically manipulate distinct populations of cells within lateral OFC that either selectively 
responded to feeding or social interaction experiences, and found differing effects on both types of 
behaviour (71). Studies such as these complement the notion that the OFC integrates the rich and 
varied range of information that is necessary to form representations of state, and further suggest 
that intercellular processes may contribute to such representations.  
Finally, we wish to conclude by re-iterating that although we have here proposed different 
roles for medial and lateral OFC in representing terminal versus initial states, respectively, these 
roles are likely achieved interdependently rather than independently. For example, although we 
have argued that medial OFC does not infer initial states directly, medial OFC-dependent retrieval of 
particular outcomes (terminal states) may sometimes be necessary for the accurate inference of the 
initial state. A potential example can be drawn from Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, in which the 
presentation of a stimulus may retrieve a representation of its associated outcome (terminal state), 
and infer the availability of that outcome in the initial state, promoting selection of the response 
that will deliver it. An alternative real-world example might be if you visit your regular café under the 
understanding it is Saturday (initial state) and you therefore infer from your knowledge that the 











offered is steak (outcome state), you may infer that today must be Saturday (initial state). In this 
way, it is possible to imagine many scenarios in which the medial and lateral OFC regions might work 
in concert to achieve a cohesive cognitive map of task space.  
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Figure 1: Simplified state space representation of making a cup of tea by the agent according to 
model-based RL. S1, the initial state is determined by being in the kitchen, taking ‘A1’ action of 
switching on the kettle transitions the agent into state S2, determined by the kettle being on. State-
to-state transitions are achieved between each state from S1-S7 in this manner by taking actions A1-




Figure 2. State space and data representations for the role of medial versus lateral OFC in 
instrumental outcome devaluation tasks. A, State space representation of a two-lever two-outcome 
instrumental outcome devaluation task. Rats in the initial state (S1) can choose to make one of two 
actions (A1 or A2) which will transition them into one of two terminal states (O1 and O2). B, When 
tested under extinction following outcome devaluation, intact goal-directed rats and rats with lateral 
OFC disruption preferentially choose the action that had given the still-valued outcome (A1, blue), 
whereas rats with mOFC disruption choose A1 and A2 equally4-5, 24-26. C, State space representation 
of a single lever contextual discrimination task; rats need to use state information (S1 or S2) to 
determine the reinforcement schedule that delivers O1. D, When tested under extinction in the 
goal-directed context, intact rats show outcome devaluation but rats with lOFC disruption don’t28-29. 














Figure 3. State space and data representation for single-outcome contingency reversal.  
A, Rats in the initial state (S1) are trained such that one action is reinforced (A1-O) and the other 
isn’t (A2-no O). B, When these contingencies are reversed (A1-no O, A2-O) rats form a new state (S2) 
within which to encode the new learning. C, Following reversal, intact rats rapidly bias responding to 
the newly reinforced action (accurate responses) and cease responding on the non-reinforced action 
(perseverative errors), whereas rats with mOFC disruption show increased perseverative errors, and 
rats with lOFC disruption show both increased perseverative errors and decreased accurate 















Table 1. Summary of behavioral findings with regards to orbitofrontal cortex subregions.  
















Intact Munster & Hauber 




Lateral OFC Intact Ostlund & Balleine, 
(2007); Lichtenberg et al., 
(2017); Panayi & Killcross, 








Lateral OFC Impaired (slower 
reversal) 
Chudsama & Robbins 
(2003);  Dalton et al., 
2016; Schoenbaum et al. 




Lateral OFC Impaired Parkes et al. (2018) 
Contingency reversal 
(value-based) 
Medial OFC Higher 
perseveration 
during reversal 
Gourley et al. (2010) 
Contingency reversal 
(probabilistic task) 
lateral OFC Impairment  Dalton et al., (2016) 
Contingency reversal 
(delay discounting) 
Medial OFC Facilitation  Mar et al. (2011) 
Contingency 
Degradation 
Lateral OFC Impaired Zimmerman et al., (2017) 
Contingency 
Degradation 




Zimmerman et al, (2018) 
Contingency 
Degradation 
































Table 2. Summary of relevant behavioural paradigms 











Paradigm Stage 1 Stage 2 Test 
Instrumental Devaluation A1-O1 
A2-O2 















Original: A1 < A2 
Reversed: A2 < A1 











S1: A1 > A2 
S2: A2 > A1 
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